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Human Nature Vindicated:

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R E P L Y

T O

Mr. B E A V E N ' s Book

Entitled,

*Supernatural Influences necessary to
Salvation:*

Being a Vindication of the fourth Pro-
position of ROBERT BARCLAY ' s A-
pology.

W H E R E I N is shewn,

That Man, in his Natural Capacity, is a Moral
Agent ; that he has Power, and is at Liberty
to do both Good and Evil : and, consequently,
can render himself either acceptable or displea-
sing to his Maker.

In a Second L E T T E R to a F R I E N D .

Humbly offered to the Consideration of the People
called QUAKERS.

By T H O . C H U B B .

L O N D O N :

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Human Nature Vindicated:

REFLECT

Mr. BEAVER'S Book

Emitted,

Supernatural Influences necessary to



Being a Vindication of the
politics of ROBERT BARCLAY, A

WHEREIN is shown,


A True Man, whose Natural Capacity, is a Moral
Agent: that he has Power, and is at Liberty
to do good, Good and evil: and, consequently,
can render himself either acceptable or disagree-
ing to his Maker.

In a second Letter to a FRIEND.

Humbly offered to the Consideration of the People
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
BY THO. CHURCH.

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MDCCLXXII.



A
VINDICATION
OF
HUMAN NATURE.

S I R,



N my former Letter I gave you my Opinion of Mr. *Barclay's* Performance, with regard to *Man's natural Ability since the Fall*; and likewise the *Grounds and Reasons* upon which that Opinion is founded. And, as I proposed it to publick Consideration, so it has given occasion to Mr. *Beaven*, to publish a Tract, entitled, *Supernatural Influences necessary to Salvation*, &c. which he is pleased to call an Answer to it. I therefore now crave leave to wait on you by a second Letter; in order to let you see that this

Performance of Mr. *Beaven's*, is not sufficient to cover the *Weakness* and *Confusion* of Mr. *Barclay's* Scheme : which, I think, will appear in the following Lines. And,

THAT I may proceed in an open and fair way, and thereby render the Case easy and plain to my Reader in the following Discourse I think it proper, *first*, to examine *wherein the Question, or Point in Debate lies*, betwixt Mr. *Barclay* and me : This being a proper Expedient to prevent all *Wandrings* from the Subject, whether on the right hand or the left. And accordingly I observe, that

THE Question betwixt me and Mr. *Barclay* is not, whether God does *sometimes* kindly interpose, and by a *Supernatural Operation* bring to Mens View such useful Truths, as they, thro' *Sloth, Bigotry*, or some other Impediment, are ignorant of, or do not attend to; or whether by those Operations he presents *such Motives* to Mens Minds as are necessary to excite to good Actions, still leaving them perfectly at Liberty, as *Moral Agents*, whether they will hearken to and follow, or whether they will reject those wholesome Counsels, as he, by such supernatural Operations, or by the written Word, is pleased to lay before them. Again,

THE Question is not, whether such supernatural Operations as aforesaid, are or
may

may be necessary or expedient to some Mens Salvation.

I SAY necessary to [some Mens] Salvation: And, I think, the Words of *Christ*, as well as the Nature of the Thing, will justify me herein: *The whole (saith our Lord) have no need of a Physician, but they that are sick. I came not to call the Righteous, but Sinners to Repentance:* as in *Mark ii. 17.* *Christ* here distinguishes betwixt righteous Men and Sinners: that is, betwixt those who make a *right Use* of their Agency to serve the Purposes of Virtue and true Goodness; and those who *abuse* their Agency to serve the Purposes of Vice and Wickedness. And, as he declares himself a *Physician* only to the *latter*; so all his Operations, whether internal or external, are directed to this End, *viz.* to prevail upon Men to repent and amend their Lives. Again,

I SAY, [necessary or expedient] to some Mens Salvation: not upon the account of any *Want* of Agency in Man, nor for *Want* of natural Ability to see the Unfitness and Vileness of his present Conduct; nor for *Want* of natural Ability to act or to refrain from acting, and so to correct and amend his Ways: But they are or may be *necessary or useful* to some Mens Salvation upon the account of that *Ignorance, Stupidity, Bigotry, Selfishness, Perverseness,*

ness, or the like, which take place in them, and are *Bars* to their reflecting upon, and amending their Ways, as aforesaid.

I SAY, that the Question or Point in Debate betwixt Mr. *Barclay* and me, is not either of those Points above-mentioned. And this I observe once for all, and desire that it may be remembered thro'out this Controversy. And therefore, whatever in Mr. *Beaven's* Book relates to these, or either of these Points, it is to be cast out of the Case, as *foreign* to the *Present Argument*. And, when that is done, I imagine his Performance will not make a *very great Figure*, when considered as under the Character of an Answer to me.

HAVING thus shewn wherein the Question or Point in Debate does *not consist*, I now proceed to shew wherein it *does*.

AND accordingly I observe, that in my Examination of Mr. *Barclay's* Principles with regard to Man's natural Ability since the Fall, I reduced his Sense of this Point into the two following Propositions.

PROPOSITION I.

“ *Man considered as Man; or that compound Creature consisting of Understanding, of Appetite, Affection, &c. which sprang from Adam as his Original Parent,*

“ *rent, has no Power or Ability at any*
 “ *time to think, speak, or act that which*
 “ *is good.*”

PROPOSITION II.

“ *Man considered as Man; or that*
 “ *Creature compounded and derived as*
 “ *aforsaid, is necessarily determined at*
 “ *all times, either by his own natural*
 “ *Composition, or by the Agency of the*
 “ *Serpent, to think, speak, and act that*
 “ *which is evil.*”

H E R E I observe, upon a Supposition, that I have *justly and truly* represented Mr. *Barclay's* Sense in the above Propositions; then the Question, or Point in Debate is apparently this, *viz.* whether *Man, in his Natural State since the Fall, is an Agent or a Patient*: that is, whether the *Good and Evil* which is performed in and by Man, be the Effect and Product of his *own* Will and Agency, or of the Will and Agency of another. So that the Question at present is, whether I have truly represented Mr. *Barclay's* Sense or not. With respect to which I observe, that, in my Examination of Mr. *Barclay's* Principles, &c. I shewed the *Grounds* upon which I proceeded in fixing his Sense as above. And, as Mr. *Beaven* has not taken the
 Pains

Pains to *examine* them, but has quoted a *Proposition* from Mr. *Barclay*, and has set that up as a *Standard* for his Sense to be judged of by : So I am content, that the Point in Debate should be tried by it. But,

T H A T I may proceed regularly in introducing the above-mentioned Proposition, I observe, that after Mr. *Beaven* had complained of me, that I had not quoted *all* the *fourth Proposition*, &c. (tho the *Remainder* of the Proposition which I omitted, related to other Things, with which the Point I undertook to examine was not concerned ; and for that Reason I omitted it) he proceeded to quote from Mr. *Barclay* more *largely* than I had done ; and at last sums up the whole in the following Proposition :

“ *R. B. affirms and maintains, that*
 “ *Man has Power and Ability during a*
 “ *Day of Mercy, and Grace afforded to*
 “ *all Men, thro’ the supernatural Influ-*
 “ *ence and enlivening Aid of Jesus Christ,*
 “ *(whereby Man is put in a Capacity of*
 “ *voluntary Agency) to think, speak, and*
 “ *act that which is good. See Apology,*
 “ *Pages 114, 115, 116, 117 ; 132, 133 ;*
 “ *147, 148, 149, 150, 151.*”

I HAVE not examined Mr. *Barclay's* Book, to see whether this Proposition is put down in the same Words in the Pages here referred to, or whether it may be fairly deduced from what Mr. *Barclay* has said in those Pages; but take it upon Trust from Mr. *Beaven*, that either they are the *very Words* of Mr. *Barclay*, or else that they express the *true Sense* of what he has said: presuming that Mr. *Beaven* would not *misrepresent* the Author he was defending. And, as the above Proposition is, by the mutual Consent both of Mr. *Beaven* and me, made the Touchstone by which Mr. *Barclay's* Sense is to be tried; so I shall understand the Terms of which it is composed in their plain and obvious Sense, that is, in the Sense which common Usage has fixed to them. And,

ACCORDINGLY I observe, that in this Proposition there are *two Things* maintained; the one is *expressed*, and the other *implied*. The Thing expressed is, that *Man, thro' the supernatural Influence, and enlivening Aid of Jesus Christ, is put in a Capacity of voluntary Agency*. The Thing implied is, that *Man considered abstractedly from and antecedent to that supernatural Influence, is not in a Capacity of voluntary Agency*; and consequently, that

he is a *mere Patient*, who does not act but is acted upon.

IT is the same as if I should say, that my Lord King, by, or thro' the Grace of his Majesty King George, is made a Peer of Great Britain. Now in this Proposition there are *two Things* maintained; the one is *expressed*, the other is *implied*. The Thing expressed is, that my Lord King, by the Grace of his Majesty, is made a Peer of Great Britain. The Thing implied is, that my Lord King, before his Majesty's Favour to him as *aforesaid* was not a Peer, but only a *Commoner* of Great Britain: For, if he had been a Peer antecedent to his Majesty's Favour, then that Grace could not possibly make him to be what he was before. And

THIS is the very Case, with respect to the Proposition I have now under Consideration: For, if Man is by a supernatural Influence, *put in a Capacity of voluntary Agency*, then it will unavoidably follow, that Man, considered abstractedly from and antecedent to that supernatural Influence, (or, in the Language of Mr. Barclay, Man in the Fall) is *not in a State or a Capacity of voluntary Agency*. Because such a supernatural Operation cannot possibly put him in a State or Capacity, which State he was in antecedent

dent to that Operation. And consequently, upon Mr. *Barclay's* Principles, Man in his natural State is a *mere Patient*: For betwixt these, *viz.* Agent and Patient, there is no *Medium*. And, tho the Word *voluntary* is annexed to the Term *Agent* in the above Proposition, yet that does not help the Case: Because every Agent is free or voluntary in those Instances, and so far as he is an Agent; a *necessary Agent* being a manifest Contradiction.

THUS it appears from the Proposition which Mr. *Beaven* has urged, that I have *justly* and *truly* represented Mr. *Barclay's* Sense in the two Propositions I have expressed it by, *viz.* that *Man as he is in the Fall, has no Power or Ability to do good, and that he is necessarily determined to do Evil*. I say, *necessarily* determined, &c. For, tho Mr. *Barclay* has not expressed himself in those very Terms, yet it is in Terms which are equivalent to them: For he saith, that, *as a Stone is prone and inclined to move down towards the Center, so the Heart of Man is prone and inclined to Evil*, &c. (See the Explanation of the fourth Proposition in Mr. *Barclay's* Apology.) Now the *Proneness* or *Inclination* which is in a *Stone* to move down towards the Center, is not such a *Proneness* or

Inclination as is in a *Man* to *Liquor* when he is *thirsty*; because this Proneness supposes in Man a *Power* and *Liberty*, either to indulge or controul that Inclination; whereas the Proneness which is in a *Stone* to move down towards the Center, supposes *Necessity*; the *Stone* having no *Power* or *Liberty* to *check* or *indulge* that Inclination; And therefore as *Man* (according to Mr. *Barclay*) is prone and inclined to *Evil*, in the like manner as a *Stone* is prone and inclined to move down towards the Center; so this Proneness and Inclination in *Man*, must be the same as *Necessity*. And,

THO Mr. *Beaven* has urged the above Proposition, as the *Sum* of what Mr. *Barclay* has said upon the Point I have under consideration: yet he intended thereby to shew, that I had *misrepresented* Mr. *Barclay's* Sense, which is a little surprising; because he takes Mr. *Barclay's* Proposition in one View, intending thereby to destroy or make void the same Proposition in another View.

IF it should be urged, that Mr. *Beaven* has quoted from Mr. *Barclay's* Book several Paragraphs, wherein the *Agency* of the natural *Man* is openly avowed: I answer, This is what I have already allowed, in my Examination of Mr. *Barclay's* Principles,

ciples, &c. and therefore Mr. *Beaven's* Quotations were *needless*. But then, what will follow from hence? why, truly nothing more nor less than this, *viz.* that Mr. *Barclay's* Scheme is *Confusion*, and a *Contradiction* to it self. Besides,

THE *fundamental Principle* in Mr. *Barclay's* Scheme, I take to be this, *viz.* that *Man in his natural Capacity*, cannot do good without a *supernatural Influence*. And if so, then Man in his natural State must (upon Mr. *Barclay's* Principles) be destitute of *moral Agency*. And consequently, I have justly and truly represented his Sense of the Point in Question, in the two Propositions I have expressed it by. Moral Agency consists in a Power and Liberty to *do*, or *avoid doing* all that Good and Evil (considered as such) which comes within the reach of that Agency: and therefore to say, that a moral Agent cannot do good, *without a supernatural Influence*, is to say a manifest Contradiction; except the Agent be placed in such Circumstances, as that no good Action can possibly come within the reach of his Agency; which surely is not the Case of *Man*. *Vain and trifling* therefore is that Pretence, *viz.* that Mr. *Barclay* allows *moral Agency* to the natural Man; because such an Allowance *inconsistent* with, and *destructive* of the fore-

forementioned fundamental Principle of his Scheme. This is what I would particularly recommend to the Consideration of Mr. *Barclay's Adherents* : and I presume it will be allowed, that they ought either to clear his Scheme from that *Confusion* and *Contradiction* I here charge upon it ; or else to give up a Scheme which cannot be defended.

UPON the whole, it evidently appears that the Question or Point in Debate betwixt Mr. *Barclay* and me, is, as I have stated it above, *viz.* Whether Man in his natural Capacity, is an *Agent* or a *Patient* : which was the first Thing I proposed to enquire into. I proceed next,

TO examine on which side of this Question the Truth lies. And, tho I think I might very fairly excuse myself from offering any Thing in defence of that side of the Question which belongs to me, seeing I have already proved the Agency of Man in my Examination of Mr. *Barclay's* Principles, &c. and Mr. *Beaven* has not produced the *Shadow* of a Proof with respect to the contrary ; yet, as the Question is now before me, I shall offer what follows.

BY Man in his natural State, I mean Man considered barely *as Man*, and as the Kind has been propagated down from *Adam* to this present Time, without any thing

thing superadded. And here I presume it will be allowed, that the Idea annex'd to the Term *Man*, contains a *Body* fitly organized, and formed in the general, as all our Bodies are, and that this Body is actuated by a *Mind*, whose principal Faculties are *Intelligence* and *Activity*. Intelligence, by which it is capable of thinking or taking in Ideas, of reflecting upon Things past, present, or to come, according as it has received Informations, and of looking into the Nature and the Consequences of Things, and thereby of forming a Judgment of the Fitness or Unfitness of Actions; and a Faculty or Power of *Self-motion* or *Action*, by which it moves and directs the Body in that way, and to serve such purposes as it intends. And,

AS the Idea which we fix to the Term *Man*, arises from the *human Composition*, as aforesaid; so that Composition is the Effect or Produce of *Nature*, and not of a supernatural Influence; that is, it is the Produce of those *Laws* by which the natural World is governed, and not the Effect of a supernatural Influence, which operates above, or contrary to those Laws. And, as Man is thus naturally compounded, so he is hereby constituted a *moral Agent*, has Power, or is at liberty for the chusing or refusing, for the doing or avoiding,

ing, either *Good* or *Evil*: And, as such, he is *accountable* for his *Actions*, and is capable of *approving* or *disapproving* of himself to *God*. And,

AS the aforesaid Composition is what constitutes the *natural Man*, so our experiencing in our selves, that we are thus constituted, *proves* to us that we are in our natural State, *moral Agents*, as aforesaid. Yea, it is by our experiencing those Powers in our selves, by which we *prove* to our selves our very Being. How can *Mr. Beaven* prove to himself his own *Existence*, but by experiencing in himself the Principles of *Intelligence* and *Activity*, acting upon, and directing the Motions of that Body which he considers as part of himself?

IF it should be urged, that, tho Man in his natural Capacity is an Agent, yet his Agency is confined to Things *natural* and *rational*; and that, with respect to Things *spiritual*, he is *put in a Capacity of voluntary Agency by a supernatural Influence*.

TO which I answer, that *Agency in Man* is, at *all Times*, and in *all Instances* and *Cases*, one and the same thing; that is, it is the same active Faculty or Power of Self-motion, and the same intellectual Faculty which excites to and directs that Motion, in *all the Actions of human Life*,
 whe-

whether those Actions be natural, rational or spiritual; or under any other Distinction which Mr. *Barclay* has used, or which his Advocates shall be pleased to use or invent. And,

THO the human Understanding may be enlightened by a *supernatural Influence*, that is, it may by this means have such Truths brought to its View, which otherwise it might have remained ignorant of, or might not have attended to: And, tho those Truths may become the *Ground* or *Reason* of action to Man, yet this does not affect his *Liberty*, nor give him any *new Agency*; he is just the same Creature as he was before, in that respect: His Actions are performed in the same way, by the same natural Facultys of Intelligence and Activity, as they were antecedent to that *Illumination*. And, to suppose the contrary, is to suppose *two* Sets of Powers in Man, which are the *Springs* of Action in him; as I have already observed in my Examination of Mr. *Barclay's* Principles, &c. And,

THO there are a variety of Impediments, such as *Sloth*, *Bigotry*, and the like, which are *Bars* to the Enlargement of human Knowledge; and tho there are a variety of *Ways* by which that Knowledge is enlarged, yet that does not alter the Case with respect to the *intellectual Faculty* it self. The Faculty, properly speaking, is not *enlarged* or

diminished by the enlarging or diminishing of the *Objects* upon which it is exercised ; nor from the *different Kind* of *Objects* which it takes in, whether natural or spiritual ; nor yet from the *different Ways* in which it receives its *Informations* : the Faculty, in all these Cases, being *no more* than a natural Faculty ; and a Judgment, formed upon those Representations made to the Mind by a supernatural Influence, is the *Judgment* of that *natural Faculty*. And, if Action follows such a Judgment, *that Action* is performed by Man's natural Faculty or Power of Self-motion, excited and directed by his intellectual Faculty, as aforesaid.

THUS I have shewn, that by Man's *natural Agency* he performs *all the Actions* which are performed by him ; whether natural, rational or spiritual, as Mr. *Barclay* has been pleased to distinguish them. And, if after all this, Mr. *Barclay's* Advocates will still maintain that Man is put in a Capacity of voluntary Agency by a supernatural Influence ; this is to maintain a Point not by Argument, but by *bare Assertions* : It is so, because they will have it to be so. And,

THO Mr. *Beaven* produces several Instances, by which he undertakes to prove that Men have been required to do several *good Things* which were *above* their natural Ability

Ability to perform ; yet I think he has failed in this, as well as in the rest. He urges the Command our Saviour gave to his Apostles, to *go teach all Nations*, with an Order, that they should *tarry at Jerusalem, until they were endowed with Power from on high*. Luke xxiv. 29. Here Mr. Beaven considers the preaching of the Gospel to all Nations as a *very good Work* ; (and truly so it was :) And, as the Apostles did not understand the Languages of all Nations, neither could they come at the Knowledge of those Languages *instantly* by any natural Ability of their own ; so from hence he infers, that they were required to do a good Work, which was *above* their natural Ability to perform.

TO which I answer : That, *antecedent* to their being in a Capacity to teach all Nations, it was *not their Duty* to teach all Nations. And therefore the Execution of that Order was suspended, till they were capable of doing it : that is, till God, by a supernatural Operation, had brought to their View the *Ideas* of those Languages, by which the People of every Nation conveyed their Minds one to another. Here we see, that the Apostles received their Ideas of those Languages by a *supernatural Influence* ; and thus far they were *passive*. But, in the Execution of the aforesaid Commission, in which they were *active*, there is no su-
C 2
pernatural

pernatural Influence to be found: their Tongues, and the Organs and Instruments of Speech to them, were no more than Parts and Members of their *natural Bodys*. The Principles of Self-Motion, which were the Springs of action in them, were no other than those Facultys of *Activity* which were Parts and Branches of the *human Composition*: And their Understandings (tho antecedently illuminated in an extraordinary way) which excited to and directed those Actions, were no other than their *natural* Facultys of Intelligence; so that there was nothing supernatural in those Actions. As weak are his two other Instances, *viz.* St. Paul's saying, *Lord, what wilt thou have me to do?* And those Men in *Acts* ii. who cried out saying, *Lord, what shall we do?* But does this suppose that what was to be done was above the reach of their agency? No, surely; for if it had, then vain was that Enquiry. But,

POSSIBLY, Mr. Beaven will here turn upon me, and tell me that I am preaching up the Doctrine of *Self-Sufficiency*; (a Snow-ball which he throws at me upon all Occasions.) And here I must beg leave to ask him what he means by Self-sufficiency? Does he mean that Man is sufficient of himself, or by his own natural Ability, to perform what comes *within* the reach of *his* Agency? If he does, then I own the Doctrine

trine of Self-sufficiency ; and, if Mr. *Beaven* maintains the contrary, he maintains a *Contradiction* : because, to say, that a Man *cannot do* what comes within the reach of his *own Agency*, is the same as to say, that he cannot do what he *can do*. But,

I F by Self-sufficiency he means an Ability to do what is *above* the reach of a Man's *own Agency* ; then I assure him that I hold no such Doctrine. But I beg leave to remind him, that, whatever is *above* a Man's Agency, *is not* his Duty. *God* does not require Men to do what they *cannot do* : He is not such an unreasonable Task-Master, as to require Bricks where there is not Materials for the making them. It is not my Duty to know that the Planet *Jupiter* is inhabited, nor yet to take wing and fly to the *Moon* : The one at present is above my *intellectual* Faculty to discover, and the other is above my *active* Faculty to perform ; and, therefore, neither of them can be my *Duty* in my present Circumstances : The Case is the same in every other Instance, whether it relates to *Knowledge* or *Practice* ; whatever is *above* our Agency, does not come into the *Line* of our Duty.

MR. *Beaven*, in like manner, treats with Contempt, what I have * else-where laid down as a *Rule* of action to every *moral Agent*,

* Supplement to the Previous Question,

whether *divine* or *human*, *viz.* the *moral Fitness of Things*. But I crave leave to ask him whether this is not a Rule of action to God, and whether it ought not to be so to us ? If he should say that we have another Rule, *viz.* the *Word and Law of God*, to conduct our Actions by ; then I would remind him that the moral Fitness of things is the *Rule and Measure* of all Divine Commands, taking all Circumstances and Consequences into the Case, * as I have elsewhere shewn. And, therefore, a *Divine Law* (what way soever it be revealed) is not another, but the same Law and Rule of action with the *moral Fitness of Things*, as aforesaid.

T H U S I have gone thro' what came in the *second* Place to be considered ; and have shewn, that *Man, as Man*, or Man in his natural Capacity, is a moral Agent : and, consequently, that the *Truth* is not on Mr. Barclay's, but on *my* side of the Question. And now I proceed,

T O shew, that tho Mr. Beaven has attempted, yet he has not been able to *prove* the contrary ; I say, *attempted* to prove the contrary : for if he has not attempted to *prove* the *contrary* to what I have now been proving, then I do not know what he is at.

The Question or Point in Debate betwixt Mr. Barclay and me is, Whether *Man*, in his natural Capacity, is an Agent or a Patient : Whether the Good and Evil, which is performed in and by Man, is strictly and properly the Effect and Produce of Man's Will and Agency ; or, whether it be the Effect and Produce of the Will and Agency of another. I maintain the former : And, as Mr. Beaven has undertook the Defence of Mr. Barclay in this Point, so it is his Business to make good the latter : And what he has said I now come to examine.

THO I own I am at a loss to know what may be properly called *Argument* in Mr. Beaven's Book, and what he will allow me to say is urged in Mr. Barclay's Defence with regard to the Question before us ; because there is no direct arguing upon the Point, but rather a *rambling* upon the Subject : However, seeing Mr. Beaven styles his Tract, *A Vindication of the fourth Proposition of Robert Barclay's Apology* ; and, seeing that Proposition is the Ground of the Controversy betwixt Mr. Barclay and me ; therefore I shall consider what Mr. Beaven has said to incline his Readers to be of Mr. Barclay's Opinion, as the Argument of his Book. And,

First, he sounds an Alarm of Danger, which naturally tends to awaken the Fear and the Resentment of his Readers. " It
" seemed

“ seemed clear to my (Mr. *Beaven's*) Un-
 “ derstanding, that the Performance of
 “ *T. Chubb* had a direct Tendency to strike
 “ at the very Vitals and Essence of the
 “ Christian Religion ; and to reflect on the
 “ stupendous Mission and Undertaking of
 “ Jesus Christ, the Lord of Life and Glory,
 “ with regard to the Deliverance of Man-
 “ kind from the Bondage of Corruption,
 “ and bringing them into the glorious Li-
 “ berty of the Sons of God.” Why truly
 this looks *frightful* : and upon Men who lay
 by the Use of their *Understandings*, it is
 likely to have its Effect ; that is, it is likely
 to *prevent* all further Enquiry. For, if
 Mens Minds can be thus *prejudiced* against
 any Set of Opinions ; if they can be pre-
 vailed upon to think that those Opinions are
vile in themselves, and *destructive* to the
 future Happiness of Mankind, *antecedent* to
 their being *proved* to be so ; then such Proof
 becomes *needless*, and all farther Enquiry is
 effectually *barred*.

THIS was the Practice of the *Perse-*
cutors of old, and has been in every Age
 since. They first represented the Principles of
 their Opponents as most *horrid* and *vile* ;
 as most *dishonourable* to God, and *injurious*
to Mankind : And, that being once fixed
 upon Mens Minds, as all farther Enquiry is
needless ; so the Heretick then becomes the
 Object of *Contempt*, and is thought worthy

to

to be *banished* from human Society. Now, tho such a Procedure may be suitable and proper to those who intend to maintain their Opinions by *force of Arms*; yet, surely, it must be otherwise to those who would do it by *force of Argument*. Besides, *Truth* does not need to be *defended* in such a way: let her but appear in her native Simplicity, and that will be a sufficient *Guard* to her. And, as to *Error*, may we all say of her what *Joash* said of the Idol *Baal*, if he be a God let him plead for himself: Judges vi. 31. But tho Mr. Beaven has represented my Principles as above, yet I beg my Reader to consider the Matter before he gives *Vent* to his *Passions*: For, as Men have sometimes been *frightened* with *Shadows*; so, if he does not examine the Point, it may possibly be his Case here.

M A N (as I have already *proved*) is, in his natural Capacity, a *moral Agent*; and, as such, he is capable of *apostatizing*, that is, of abusing his Agency to serve the Purposes of *Vice* and *Wickedness*, whereby he exposes himself to the *just* Displeasure of *Almighty God*. And Men, in this State of *Apostasy*, are, in the Language of the Bible, called *Sinners*; and are said to be *lost*. Now the Question is what *Christ* undertook to do, when he came to *seek* and to *save* that which was *lost*.

NOT surely (what Mr. Barclay's and Mr. Beaven's Scheme sets forth) to put Men in a Capacity of voluntary Agency; because *that State* they were in antecedent to his Undertaking, and without it they could not have apostatized, could not have been Sinners; it being absurd to suppose that there can be Sin where there is not Agency. And therefore, if supernatural Influences are necessary to put Men in a Capacity of voluntary Agency, and thereby to render them capable of Salvation; then hereby they are equally necessary to render them capable of Damnation also. So that if the Title to Mr. Beaven's Book had been run out to its full Length, then it would have stood thus: [Supernatural Influences necessary to Salvation and Damnation.] For, as bare Agency does not save nor damn Men; so it renders them equally capable of either.

THUS stands the Case upon Mr. Barclay's Principles. Now, if Christ does not save Sinners by putting them in a Capacity of voluntary Agency, as it is most manifest he does not; then the Question still remains, what he undertook to do when he came to seek and to save that which was lost.

TO which I answer in short: That Christ undertook to save Sinners by using all those Methods, whether by internal or external Operations, which are consistent with
and

and proper to work upon *moral Agents*, in order to bring them out of their *Apostasy*, and so to reduce them to a *right Use* of their Agency : that is, to bring them to Repentance and amendment of Life ; that thereby they might render themselves the *suitable and proper Objects* of God's Mercy and Grace. Now, if this be the Case, (which I think whoever reads the Gospel with Care and Attention will easily see that it is ;) then it will follow that Mr. Beaven's Fears were *groundless* ; and that my Principles are *free* from those *Imputations* he has laid upon them.

UNDER this Head of Argument, I shall consider what Mr. Beaven says of my Principles with respect to Prayer, *viz.* " It " seems directly and unavoidably to tend " to render all Prayer to God for any " Blessing. Help or Aid from him, for the " performance of any Branch of Goodness " that will render him acceptable to his " Maker, impertinent, preposterous, " and useless." Page 30. But I beg this Author to consider, whether, if God kindly interposes in the Hour of Mens *Temptations*, and, by a supernatural Influence brings to their View such *useful Truths* as are proper for them to reflect upon, in order to keep them from *sinning* ; or, if he presents to Mens Minds *such Motives* as are proper to excite them to good Actions,

(which he may do consistent with my Principles :) I say, I desire to know of Mr. *Beaven*, whether these are not great *Favours* which are worthy of our most solemn *Addresses* and *Applications* to God for ; and, that if we do pray for them, whether such Prayers are *impertinent*, *preposterous*, and *useless*. I shall proceed no farther on this Head of Argument, because I think what I have said is a sufficient Answer to whatever there is of this kind which runs thro' Mr. *Beaven's* Book. Again,

Secondly, Mr. *Beaven* urges, in favour of Mr. *Barclay*, that he was allowed to be a *very great Man*, a Man of the *first Rank*. He was allowed to be so by the *Author* of the Letter in the *British Journal*, *Saturday April 23. 1723, N^o 30*. He was allowed to be so by Mr. *Norris*, who says that he had rather engage with an *hundred Bellarmin's*, *Harding's* and *Stapleton's*, than with *one Barclay*. Now, admitting that Mr. *Barclay* was allowed by the Persons before-mentioned, and by thousands more, to be a *very great Man*, a Man of the *first Rank* ; yet it will not follow from thence, that his Opinion of the Point in Debate is the *Truth* : If the Judgments of very great Men were to be set up as the *Standard of Truth*, we should be in a *very sad Case* ; because very great Men have differed in their

their Judgments one from another. Besides,

U R G I N G the *Authority* of great Names, is making the Appeal to such Judges as, I am persuaded, Mr. Beaven in other Cases will not be determined by. If I had urged the *Opinion* of Mr. Norris, or the *Author* of the Letter in the *British Journal*, or such and such a *Pope* or *Council* against Mr. Barclay; I imagine Mr. Beaven would have been so far from submitting his Judgment to their Authority, that, on the contrary, he would have turned them upon my hands with *Contempt*. He might have told me that this was making the *Appeal* to Men, who are not constituted *infallible Judges*; and so are not qualified to give an absolute and certain Determination in the present Case. And, if this would have been a proper Answer to me, then surely it must be so to Mr. Beaven. Again,

Thirdly, Mr. Beaven urges what Mr. Barclay himself has said in other Parts of his Book. To which it is sufficient to answer, that, with respect to the Point in Debate, Mr. Barclay is *inconsistent* with himself. He sometimes *allows*, and sometimes *denys* that the natural Man has *voluntary Agency*. But, supposing he had been uniform and consistent, yet his *Authority* is of *no weight* in the present Case. Again,

Fourthly,

Fourthly, Mr. *Beaven* urges in favour of Mr. *Barclay*, what *Monro* says by way of Query, *viz.* " I would fain ask those who
 " deny that any other Light is necessary in
 " order to know God and Divine Things
 " savingly, but that of Reason assisted by
 " outward Revelation ; what tolerable
 " Sense they will put on the devout and
 " ardent Breathings of the Psalmist, *Psalm*
 " *cxix.* *Open mine Eyes ; teach me thy*
 " *Statutes ; give me Understanding, and*
 " *the like.*" He likewise quotes Mr. *Locke* speaking thus : " I am far from deny-
 " ing that God can or doth sometimes en-
 " lighten Mens Minds in the apprehending
 " certain Truths, or excite them to good
 " Actions by the immediate Influence and
 " Assistance of the Holy Ghost." To
 which Mr. *Beaven* adds *Tully* and *Hiero-*
cles. This indeed was proper to shew his
reading : But, as I have not argued against
 supernatural Influences ; nor have denied
 such Influences to be in some Respect and
 under some Circumstances necessary to
 Man's Salvation ; so I set by these Authors
 (or rather what is quoted from them) as
foreign to the present Question. Besides,
 if those Authors had advanced something in
 Mr. *Barclay's* Favour, the quoting them
 would not have been of weight ; because it
 is making the Appeal to such Judges, as,
 I presume, Mr. *Beaven* would not be de-
 termined

terminated by (as I observed above.) And, I am persuaded, that if I had urged *such Arguments* against Mr. Barclay, as Mr. Beaven does for him; it would have ministered to him an Occasion of *Triumph*. Again,

Fifthly, Mr. Beaven urges what I have said as favouring Mr. Barclay's Scheme, and as an *Evidence* against my self. And accordingly he quotes my Words, which are as follow. Page 45 of Mr. Beaven's Book :
 " If it should be farther urged, that Man
 " does not receive any Addition to his
 " Composition, neither does God act with-
 " out the Agency of Man ; but God co-
 " operates with Man, and thereby enables
 " him to perform that good, which, with-
 " out such a Cooperation, he could not
 " do : I answer, that this *may* be the Case
 " in some Instances." Mr. Beaven having
 thus quoted my Words, he proceeded to
 make his Remarks upon them, which are as
 follows : " On which I observe, if this be
 " the Case in some Instances, that God ena-
 " bles Man to perform that good which
 " without such a Cooperation he could not
 " do ; then his Hypothesis of the Ability
 " of the natural Man to perform every
 " Branch of Goodness without supernatural
 " Help is overturned by himself, and all
 " his Reasonings and Arguments built on
 " that Hypothesis vanish like Smoak. This
 " shews

“ shews the Amusement of his own Scheme,
 “ and not of *R. B.* which he unjustly
 “ charges it with, &c.”

H E R E we see this Author *triumphs* over me as if he had gotten a *complete Victory*. But, if he will be pleased to read over again with Care and Attention all that I have said upon the Subject in the Pamphlet referred to ; I imagine he will then see that his Triumphs are *groundless*. For, when I desired the Depreciators of Man's natural Ability to give a Case in which it will appear that the natural Man (as they express it) has not Ability to perform any one Branch of Goodness; which will render him acceptable to his Maker ; could Mr. *Beaven* be so *weak* as to think that by a *Branch of Goodness* I intended such an Instance as is *above* the reach of human Agency, considering every Man's Circumstance in Life ? (and as such it is *not* his Duty, nor is the Practice of it *necessary* to render him acceptable to God.) Could he think that I suppose a *poor Man* who has scarce Bread and Clothing for himself, has *Ability* to feed and clothe all the Poor of this Kingdom, when he is destitute of the Materials which constitute that Ability ? If he did think so, I assure him he is *mistaken*. And, tho the feeding and clothing all the Poor of this Kingdom would be a *very good Work*, yet it is not the poor Man's *Duty* to perform it,
 nor

nor is the Performance of this good Work *necessary* to render him acceptable to his Maker. Not but a poor Man has so far natural Ability in the present Case, as that if God should interpose, and in a *miraculous Way* put so much Food and Apparel into his Possession, he could then distribute it all, to answer the Purposes aforesaid, without a *supernatural Influence*. And, tho this miraculous Interposition of Almighty God renders the poor Man capable of performing *that Good*, which, without such an Interposition, he could not do ; yet, strictly speaking, this does not *add* to his natural Ability, much less does it give him any *new Agency*. For all the Hand which the poor Man has in this good Work, is performed by *that Ability* which arises from his *natural Composition*. So that my Hypothesis stands *firm and unshaken*, notwithstanding the *Attacks* of this Author.

AS weak is what he further urges upon this Head, that, because I allow supernatural Operations *may*, in some Instances be *necessary* or *expedient* to reduce Men to a right Use of their Agency, (like as if a Son should do amiss, it would or might be *necessary* or *expedient* for the Father to tell him his Faults, that he might amend them) therefore he pretends that I overthrow my own Scheme. But how, or upon what Account do those Operations become *necessa-*

ry or *useful* on my Scheme? Not for want of voluntary Agency in Man, not because he has not natural Ability to know and do his Duty : but because he *suffers* himself to be led away by *Passion, Appetite*, or the like; and so lives in the *Neglect*, or in the *Abuse* of that natural Ability that he has. It is upon these Accounts that those Operations do or may become necessary. And, I hope this will satisfy my Reader, that my Scheme is not so *confused*, as Mr. *Beaven* imagined. But further,

MAN in his natural Capacity is a *moral Agent*, (as I have shewn above) and if at any time he *abuses* his Agency, and lives in a Way which is unworthy of his *manly Character*; such a Conduct of course renders him disagreeable, and vile in the Eyes of his Maker. And when that is the Case, then in the Nature of the Thing, nothing but his *Repentance* and *Reformation* can possibly render him agreeable and acceptable to God: supposing God is such a *wise* and *good* Being, as * I have elsewhere proved him to be. Now, tho a Man be in such a *wicked* State, yet that does not *destroy* his Agency. He is in the Course of his Wickedness as much a *moral Agent*, as he was when he *first* began to transgress the Rule of his

* See Vindication of God's Moral Character.

Duty. Every *criminal* Action, or Omission, is the Subject of his Choice; he has Power, and is at liberty to chuse, and do the contrary: and this renders his Conduct *criminal*, which otherwise it could not be. And,

AS Repentance and Reformation are absolutely necessary to render such a Man *acceptable* to his Maker; so such *Reflections* and *Considerations* as are proper to work upon him as a moral Agent, are necessary to that Repentance. And tho he is *capable* of *reflecting* upon, and *amending* his *Ways* as *aforesaid*, and therefore *can* do it if he pleases: yet he does not do it, but either *carelessly* goes on in his Wickedness, without reflecting upon his Conduct; or else *obstinately* persists in it notwithstanding such Reflections. This being the State of a wicked Man, whoever would *reform* him, (that is, would be an Instrument in *persuading* him to reform himself; for Reformation, strictly speaking, is the Sinner's own Act) it is *necessary*, or *expedient*, or *proper* that he should some way or other introduce, or make present to the Sinner's Mind, such *Reflections* as when attended to and followed, would be to him a proper *Ground* and *Reason* of his Change. And it is in *this* View, that I allow supernatural Operations may be *necessary* or *expedient* to reduce Men to a right Use of their Agency. So that such Operations are or may be neces-

fary, not to help wicked Men to do what they could not do without those Operations; but to *persuade* them (if they will be prevailed upon, that being the Subject of their own Choice) to what they could do, but would not, or did not. I shall proceed no further upon this Head of Argument, because I think this will suffice to shew, that I am not yet *convinced* upon my own Evidence. Again,

Sixthly and lastly, Mr. *Beaven* urges several Texts of Scripture in favour of Mr. *Barclay*, with regard to the Point in hand. So that the Question here is, whether the Bible teaches any such Doctrine, *viz.* that *Man in his natural State, as he is the Offspring of Adam, is destitute of Agency; and that he is put in a Capacity of voluntary Agency by a supernatural Influence.* To which it is sufficient to answer, that this Doctrine is plainly repugnant to the Nature and the Truth of Things, (as I have largely shewn) and therefore is *absolutely false*. Besides,

THE Scripture considers Man in his natural Capacity, as having *apostatized*, as having *sinned*, without once supposing that a supernatural Influence was necessary to render him *capable* of sinning or apostatizing. And God is represented as mercifully *interposing*: not to render Men *capable* of being Apostates, by putting them in a Capacity of voluntary

voluntary Agency ; but to *bring them out of their Apostasy*, by using all proper Methods of Persuasion, whether by internal or external Operations, to bring them to Repentance and Amendment of Life. Now, if the Case be thus represented in the *Scripture*, as is most notoriously evident it is; then this is as plain a Proof as the *Scripture* can possibly give, that Man, in his *natural Capacity*, is a *moral Agent* ; has power to do *Good and Evil*, and is at liberty for the Choice of either of these ; because, if this was not his Case, he could not *sin*, could not *apostatize* ; he could not be *lost*, as aforesaid. But, farther,

I N the *Scripture* there are some *figurative* and *borrowed* Expressions ; as in *Isaiah lix. 1. Behold, the Lord's Hand is not shortened that it cannot save, neither his Ear heavy that it cannot hear, &c.* And there are some *lofty* and *strong* Expressions, (according to the Usage of the *Eastern Countrys*) in which there is much more expressed, when taken strictly, than was intended should be understood ; as in *John xv. 5. Without me ye can do nothing.* In the first of these Texts God is spoken of as having *Hands and Ears* ; and in the latter the *Disciples* of Christ are spoken of as *uncapable of Action*. Now, supposing a Man should found upon the above-mention'd Words of *Isaiah* this Doctrine, viz. that God has a *material Body*
con-

constituted of Hands and Ears, and formed in the general as all our Bodys are : and, supposing that he should found upon the above-mentioned Words of Christ this Doctrine, viz. that Man, in his natural Capacity, is destitute of voluntary Agency : In such a Case it would be sufficient to answer, that those Doctrines are and must be erroneous, because Reason and Fact shew the contrary. And, therefore, to insist that the fore-mentioned Texts are to be understood in such a Sense as expresses those Doctrines, is at once to offer an Affront to the Scriptures, and to the Understandings of Men. For, as the Scriptures and Reason assure us that God is a Being purely spiritual, abstracted from Body ; so, in like manner, the Scriptures and Experience assure us that Man, as Man, has in him the Facultys of Intelligence and Activity, which constitute him a moral Agent, as aforesaid.

IN the present Case there is no occasion of a strict Enquiry into the Sense and Meaning of the Texts above, or of any other Texts of Scripture upon which the aforesaid Doctrines may be liable to be founded. For, as those Doctrines contain Propositions which are manifestly false in Fact ; so from hence it will follow, that, as the Bible is the Rule of Truth and the Word of God, it cannot possibly contain in it any such Doctrines. And therefore if Mr. Barclay's Adherents

herents shall still maintain that the latter of those Doctrines is contained in Scripture ; this, I think, is to maintain that the Scriptures are as *confused* and *contradictory* as their Scheme.

TO this I may add, that what our Saviour said of his *Disciples* in the Text above, the same he has said of *himself*, as in *John* v. 30. *I can of mine own self do nothing*. And from hence I argue : If it will follow from those Words of Christ (*viz. without me ye can do nothing*) that Man, when considered in his natural Capacity, abstracted from all supernatural Influences, is *destitute of voluntary Agency* ; then it will equally follow from those other Words of Christ, (*viz. I can of mine own self do nothing*) that Christ, when considered in his natural Capacity, abstracted from the Act and Influence of every other Agent, is *destitute of voluntary Agency* also. But surely the latter of these will not be admitted, and therefore not the former. And,

FROM hence, I presume, my Reader will see how *unkind* or rather *unjust* Mr. Beaven's Charge upon me is, *viz. That I must think the holy Scriptures romantick and wild : That the Evangelists were some of the most designing or deluded Creatures that ever lived ; and That Jesus Christ himself is not free from such Imputations*, Page 2. of Mr. Beaven's Introduction. With respect to which I beg him to consider what manner

manner of Spirit he is of : and whether this be the Produce of that *meek, gentle, charitable Spirit* which becomes the *Gospel of Christ* ; or whether it be not rather the Produce of that *Resentment* which he has taken up against me, tho I think without any *just Ground*. However, I assure him, that I am so much a *Christian* as not to allow my-self in such a Practice.

T H U S I have gone thro' the *principal* Things which are urged in Mr. *Barclay's* Defence. There are other things of less note in Mr. *Beaven's* Book, which I have not yet taken notice of ; such as his complaining that I quoted from the *fourth Edition* of *Robert Barclay's* Apology in *English*. But this, I think, answers no other Purpose than to acquaint the World that he is a Man of *Letters*, who has read Mr. *Barclay's* Apology in *Latin*. And, tho this is Mr. *Beaven's* Case, yet I presume he does not need to be told that it is not mine. I am acquainted with no other Language than our own Mother-Tongue ; neither do I pretend to be a *Master* of that, so as to understand all the *Grammar-Rules*, by which Men of *Letters* govern themselves in their Writings ; it being sufficient to my purpose that I can convey my Mind *plainly* and *easily* to my Reader : and, if herein I should not be *correct*, I am persuaded every *ingenious* Mind will excuse it.

NEITHER have I yet taken notice of the mighty Value put upon Mr. *Barclay's* Scheme, on the account of its being a *Mean* betwixt *Calvinism* and *Pelagianism*. For, supposing it to be a *Mean* betwixt twenty *Extremes*, yet it makes nothing hereby against me; it being sufficient to my Purpose to shew, (which I have done) that it is *inconsistent* with Truth, and with it-self.

NOR have I hitherto taken notice of that *Contempt* with which Mr. *Beaven* treats what he is pleased to call my *darling* Notion, *viz.* the *Nature and Truth of Things*: a two-edged Sword, with which I am quickly to dispatch the *Doctrine of the Bible*; reduce Religion to the moral Fitness of Things; and discard and banish the holy Writings out of the World, as a Collection of *romantick and wild Storys of Actions done by Men impossible in the Nature and Reason of Things*, &c. These are some of the *Flights* which Mr. *Beaven* has been pleased to take. But I would beg him to explain himself, and shew what he would be at.

WOULD he disarm Mankind of every *Guard*, and lay them open to every *Imposition*? that so when any one of the Species shall take it into his Head that he is under a *divine Impulse* or *supernatural Influence*; and, consequently, that whatever he shall deliver as the Produce of it, is a *divine*

Oracle : then Mankind have no *Rule* or *Means* by which they can judge whether it be so or not, but must *blindly submit* to whatever is thus *dictated* to them. I say, if this be his Design in treating with *Contempt*, and thereby endeavouring to *discard* what he is pleased to call my darling *No-tion*, (which if it be not, I cannot conceive what he is driving at) then let him *openly avow* it. Tho I imagine Mankind are not so *bewitched* as to give up their *Understandings*, as aforesaid : And, I think, Mr. *Beaven* pays but a *mean Compliment* to the *Scriptures*, by considering them as a Collection of *Doctrines* and *Facts* that will not bear an *open* and *fair Examination*. So that the *Nature and Reason of Things* ; the *Nature and Truth of Things* ; and the *moral Fitness of Things*, must be set aside as *ridiculous Principles*, to make way for our *receiving* them.

I SAY, there are many other things in Mr. *Beaven's* Book, which I have not replied to : But then these are personal, and therefore I despise them ; and they are *foreign* to the Question or Point in Debate, and are an Address to the *Passions* and not to the *Understandings* of Men ; and therefore I set them by as so many *Blanks*.

UPON the whole, I think I have fully shewn that the *Scheme* laid down in Mr. *Barclay's* Book is *confused*, *absurd* and *contradictory* ;

tradictory; and that Mr. Beaven has not been able to *free* it from this Charge: However, if *he*, or his *more able Friend* shall be pleased to make a *Rejoinder*, the way is clear before them. It is but to come *openly* and *fairly* into the Question, free from all *Disguises* and *Wandrings* from the Subject; and then I am persuaded the Controversy will soon come to an End.

TO conclude: I observe, That the *great End* and *Purpose* of Christ's coming into the World was to *save Sinners*; and not to put Men in a *Capacity* of sinning. He came not to make us *Men*, by putting us in a *Capacity* of voluntary Agency; but to make us *good Men*, by using all those *Methods* which are consistent with, and proper to work on *moral Agents*, whether by internal or external Operations: thereby to engage us to *repent* and *amend* our *Ways*; to live *godlily*, *soberly* and *righteously* in this World, and so to *fit* and *prepare* us for the Happiness of another. And, I persuade my-self, that in *this View* Christianity is *capable* of being *defended*.

ONCE more, and I have done: Either Man in his natural Capacity is a *moral Agent*, or he is not; if he is, then Man, in his natural State, has *Power* and is at *Liberty* to do, or avoid doing either Good or Evil; and, consequently, has *Power*, and

is at Liberty to render himself *acceptable* or *displeasing* to his Maker, without a supernatural Influence : I say, this must be unavoidably his Case, supposing him to be a *moral Agent*, as aforesaid. For, if Man, in his natural State, has not a Power and Liberty of doing or avoiding either Good or Evil, and consequently of rendering himself acceptable or displeasing to his Maker ; then he is not an Agent, but a mere *Patient*. And, to say in this Case that there is in Man a *Proneness* and *Inclination* to Sin, is to say nothing to the Purpose : Because in a *free Creature* it is supposed that there is a Power and Liberty either to *indulge* or *controul* that Proneness and Inclination. So that a Power and Liberty of doing Good or Evil, of pleasing or displeasing God, still remains : For, if this Proneness and Inclination to Sin, either *destroys* or is *inconsistent* with a Power and Liberty of doing Good or Evil, of pleasing or displeasing God, as aforesaid ; then it is the same as *Necessity*, and consequently it destroys, or is inconsistent with our *Agency*. But, if Man, in his natural Capacity, is *not* a moral Agent, then I acknowledge his Case to be otherwise than I have represented it to be ; and when that is shewn, I will give up the Point. However,

THIS

THIS I think is a matter of the *utmost Importance*, and in which Mankind are nearly concerned; because all *Morality* and *Religion* has an apparent Dependence upon it. For if Man is such a Creature as I have above proved him to be; that is, if he has in him a Power and Liberty of doing either Good or Evil, and either of these is the Subject of his *own free Choice*, so that he might if he had pleased have chose and done the contrary; then his Actions in every Instance will be more or less religious or irreligious, virtuous or vicious, as the *Motives* to those Actions which are the *Ground* and *Reason* of them, are more or less so: and then those Actions will be justly *approved* or *condemned*, not only in the Judgment of God, but of every Man's own Conscience accordingly. But if Man in his natural Capacity as *Man*, has not a Power and Liberty as aforesaid, then with *respect to him*, those Actions which are performed by his Instrumentality, has no Religion nor Irreligion, Virtue nor Vice in them; neither can he in *Justice* and *Equity* be approved or condemned in his own Conscience, nor in the Judgment of any other Being, upon the account of them. And,

AS a Power and Liberty of doing either Good or Evil is *absolutely necessary* to render our Actions religious or irreligious,

glorious, virtuous or vicious ; so every Principle which destroys or is inconsistent with human Liberty, I think ought carefully to be guarded against, as being highly injurious to Mankind. For when Men consider themselves under a Fatality, and that their Actions are not the Subject of their own free Choice ; (whether that Fatality be brought upon them by the Fall of Adam, or any other way ; or whether it appears under the Disguise of another Name ;) then, not only the exciting or restraining Influence, which otherwise might arise from a Sense of the Good or Evil of the Action in view, is taken away ; but also every Motive to Virtue and Religion is weakened, if not destroyed by it : because in this Case the Actions which are performed in and by Man, are not strictly and properly the Effect and Produce of his own Will and Agency, but of the Will and Agency of another. And,

AS the fundamental Principle in Mr. Barclay's Scheme is, that Man cannot do Good without a supernatural Influence ; and as this Principle is inconsistent with human Liberty ; (as I have shewn above) so the Ground or Reason of my examining Mr. Barclay on this Head, was not to engage my self in a wrangling Controversy, but to prevent the misleading of Man-

Mankind in a Point of such Importance.
 And, as in the foregoing Discourse I have
 fully proved the *Agency* of the natural
 Man, and I think thereby have said all that
 is necessary, or that the Subject requires;
 so I shall take my Leave of it and you, oh
 am,

SIR,

Your Obligated

Humble Servant, &c.

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